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A RIVER BASIN RUNS THROUGH IT: 
EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT AND WATER 
RIGHTS AT THE FLORIDA-GEORGIA LINE 
MICHAEL MUÑOZ† 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Just before the publication of this note, Special 
Master Ralph Lancaster issued his Report in Florida v. Georgia.1 While 
not binding on the Supreme Court, the report recommends a denial of 
Florida’s request for relief.2 Specifically, Lancaster pointed out that 
Florida did not meet its burden of showing that it would suffer material 
harm without the apportionment—in the form of a cap on Georgia’s 
water consumption—that it requested.3 The Special Master’s utilitarian 
recommendation is somewhat surprising given past cases recognizing 
environmental harm. Still, the Special Master’s emphasis on the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ discretion in the operation of water controls in the 
ACF Basin4 appears to qualify his answer and suggests that there are 
still more battles to be fought in these water wars.   
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† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2017; University of Florida, B.A. 2014. I 
would like to thank the members of the Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum for their 
help in preparing this note for publication. I would also like to thank my wife, Victoria Perez, for 
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1. Report of the Special Master February 14, 2017, Florida v. Georgia, No. 22O142 ORG
(U.S. 2013). 
2. Id. at 70.
3. Id. at 68–69.
4. See, e.g.¸ id. at 69 (noting the Corp’s “extensive discretion” and ability to determine when
to increase or decrease water flows). 
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“Yeah, way down yonder on the Chattahoochee 
Never knew how much that muddy water meant to me.”5 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Water scarcity has received much attention in recent years. With 
extensive droughts in western states such as California, Nevada, and 
Arizona, the issue of water use—who may use, how much, and for 
what—has grown in importance. States east of the Mississippi have for 
the most part been spared the difficult questions of water rights and 
allocation that western states have historically faced.6 However, over 
the past three decades, a tense water dispute has emerged in the east 
between Florida, Alabama, and Georgia over the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River (ACF) River Basin.7  This dispute has now 
reached a critical point in Florida v. Georgia,8 a case within the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction9 and currently under 
consideration by a special master.10 
In one of the few major equitable apportionment cases in the 
east,11 Florida has asked the Court to equitably apportion—that is, 
fairly divide among the affected states—water flows from the ACF 
River Basin, flows that Florida claims are being impeded by water use 
in Georgia.12 Florida’s theory of the case, which highlights ecosystem 
effects and incorporates environmentally guided arguments,13 presents 
an opportunity for the Supreme Court to better tailor its equitable 
apportionment doctrine to address contemporary understandings of 
environmental interrelationships and the values of ecosystem services. 
 
 5. ALAN JACKSON, Chatahoochee, on A LOT ABOUT LIVIN’ (AND A LITTLE ‘BOUT LOVE) 
(Arista Records 1992). 
 6. See Barton H. Thompson, The Role of the Courts in Water Law, 66 S.C. L. REV. 581, 581 
(2015) (discussing the differences and fragmentation of water rights across the United States). 
 7. See generally Florida’s Complaint for Equitable Apportionment & Injunctive Relief, 
Florida v. Georgia, No. 22O142 ORG (U.S. 2013) [hereinafter Complaint] (asserting Florida’s 
right to equitable apportionment of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin). 
 8. Id. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the 
Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”). 
 10. William Droze, Angela Levin & Kate Warihay, Special Master Appointed in Florida v. 
Georgia “Water Wars” and New ACT Lawsuits, ENVTL. LAW & P. MONITOR (Jan. 5, 2015),  
http://www.environmentallawandpolicy.com/2015/01/special-master-appointed-in-florida-v-
georgia-water-wars-and-new-act-lawsuits/. 
 11. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 645 (1945) (finding a flat percentage 
appropriation to be the most equitable method of division after taking into consideration the 
principle of priority of appropriation and other relevant factors). 
 12. Complaint, supra note 7, at 21. 
 13. Id. at 17–20. 
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This paper explores Florida v. Georgia in light of the novel 
arguments presented and their potential interactions with the existing 
equitable apportionment framework. Part II begins by briefly profiling 
the ACF River Basin and the various uses of its water flows in Florida, 
Georgia, and Alabama. Next, it traces the history of the ACF dispute 
(and the agreements preceding it), noting the various failed attempts 
to resolve this complex tri-state issue. Part II concludes with a 
consideration of each party’s interest in Florida v. Georgia, paying 
special attention to the elements that make this case unique. Part III 
focuses on laying out the current equitable apportionment doctrine and 
describes the key cases (notably, nearly all cases between western 
states) on the subject.14 Part IV examines the specific environmentalist 
justifications for apportionment that Florida is presenting in this case, 
which contrast markedly from Georgia’s more traditional economic 
and use-based arguments. This section also looks at Alabama’s 
interests as an intervener in the case. Finally, Part V offers predictions 
for how Florida v. Georgia may ultimately be resolved and what sorts 
of injuries the Court will be willing to consider in deciding the case. 
Specifically, it will explore whether the arguments presented in Part IV 
might find a place in equitable apportionment doctrine and, if so, what 
sort of outcomes the doctrine might produce in both this water rights 
dispute and others that could arise in the future. When appropriate, the 
paper will approach each state’s interests and arguments in turn, 
working downstream from Georgia through Alabama and ending in 
Florida to highlight the flow of effects southward through the ACF 
River Basin. 
II. THE RIVER, THE PARTIES, AND THE CASE: WHAT’S AT STAKE 
The facts of Florida v. Georgia are complex. The case involves a 
system of three major rivers flowing through and providing water for 
as many states (Florida, Georgia, and Alabama).15 Each state involved 
in the dispute uses the water for different purposes—purposes that, 
they argue, are often at odds with one another.16 Moreover, the ACF 
River Basin has been the subject of litigation since the late 1980s, 
 
 14. See, e.g., Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 617–18 (discussing factors to be considered when making 
equitable appropriation decisions). 
 15. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 16. See Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme 
Court: The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 401–02 
(2004) (noting Georgia’s desire to increase water consumption for municipal and industrial 
purposes, while Florida and Alabama fear the adverse impacts this would have on their 
communities, both ecologically and economically). 
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resulting in a veritable saga of cases preceding this one.17 This section 
unpacks these key issues of use and the history of failed compromises 
and stopgap measures. First, it provides an overview of the ACF River 
Basin, focusing on its ecology and water flows. Next, this section 
considers the ways in which Florida, Georgia, and Alabama each use 
flows from the ACF River Basin and how these uses are interrelated. 
Finally, the section summarizes key moments in the ACF litigation 
saga, which includes interstate negotiations, failed compromises, and 
court cases ranging from district courts to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
A. The ACF River Basin 
The ACF River Basin consists of three major rivers in Alabama, 
Georgia, and Florida.18 The Chattahoochee River originates in Helen, 
Georgia (north of Atlanta) and flows 436 miles southwestward, mostly 
along the Alabama-Georgia state line, until emptying into Lake 
Seminole in the Florida panhandle.19 The Flint River originates south 
of Atlanta and flows southward through Georgia for 346 miles before 
it too empties into Lake Seminole.20 Lake Seminole, in turn, serves as 
the point of origin of the Apalachicola River, which flows southward 
from the lake through the Florida panhandle and empties into the 
Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico.21 
The ACF River Basin is home to a number of human, animal, and 
plant populations. In 2010, 3.835 million people lived within the River 
Basin—92 percent of these people in the state of Georgia and 75 
percent just within the city of Atlanta alone.22 The remaining 8 percent 
of the population lives in much smaller communities of fewer than 
200,000 in Florida and Alabama.23 The ACF River Basin is also home 
to around 150 species of fish (several of which are listed as threatened, 
rare, unusual or of special concern by at least one state or the U.S. Fish 
 
 17. Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Waters and Fading Opportunities, 
16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 83, 86–88 (2000) (describing series of litigation between Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia over the ACF River Basin). 
 18. STEPHEN J. LAWRENCE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 
REPORT 2016-5007, WATER USE IN THE APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT RIVER 
BASIN, ALABAMA, FLORIDA, AND GEORGIA, 2010, AND WATER USE TRENDS, 1985–2010 1 
(2016) [hereinafter 2016 USGS REPORT]. 
 19. Id. at 18. 
 20. Id. at 20–21. 
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 15–16 
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and Wildlife Service) and forty-nine species of mussel.24  The ACF 
River Basin contains the highest species density of amphibians and 
reptiles in North America north of Mexico.25 The region is also home 
to 1,600 plant species, including the Ogeechee tupelo tree, which is the 
primary source of tupelo honey in the United States.26 More than 100 
total species in the ACF River Basin are designated as threatened, 
endangered, or of concern.27 
B. Dueling Uses 
The dispute over water rights in the ACF River Basin can be 
characterized rather succinctly: it is a case of dueling uses. Generally 
speaking, both Florida and Alabama claim that their uses of water 
flows from the ACF River Basin are being hindered by uses upstream, 
primarily those in the Atlanta area.28 Because of the interconnected 
nature of the Flint, Chattahoochee, and Apalachicola Rivers, they 
argue, water withdrawals in Georgia limit the flows in Alabama and 
Florida.29 Each day, roughly 1,645 million gallons of water are 
withdrawn from the ACF River Basin for a variety of uses by a variety 
of users—most of these withdrawals (around 1,068 million gallons per 
day) are from surface water.30 Interestingly, the primary use of the 
ACF River Basin’s flows differs in each state; some of these uses are 
withdrawal-heavy, while others are not.31 It is this fact that makes 
Florida v. Georgia especially likely to have a substantial impact on the 
evolution of equitable apportionment doctrine. In order to understand 
just how these different uses might conflict with one another, it is best 
to travel downstream with the water flowing through the ACF River 
Basin. 
 
 
 
 24. Carol A. Couch, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NATIONAL WATER-QUALITY 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING OF THE APALACHICOLA-
CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT RIVER BASIN, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/nawqa/publications/environ.ht 
ml (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 25. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File a Complaint at 15, Florida v. Georgia, No. 
22O142 ORG (U.S. 2013) [hereinafter Brief]. 
 26. Complaint, supra note 7, at 10. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Grant, supra note 16, at 402. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 2016 USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 24. 
 31. See Matthew Z. Leopold, Florida’s Fight to Save the Apalachicola: An Environmental 
and Cultural Treasure at Risk, 46 NO. 1 ABA TRENDS 13, 14 (2014) (comparing the immense 
differences in use by the states of the water system). 
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At issue in Florida v. Georgia is Georgia’s primary use of the ACF 
River Basin’s flows as a source of the state’s public water supply.32 
Public water supply is water that is “withdrawn, treated, and delivered 
to domestic (residential), commercial, and industrial customers by 
public water suppliers,” such as municipal governments and utilities.33 
Because northern Georgia lacks significant groundwater resources, the 
Chattahoochee River serves as the main source of public water for 
Atlanta, the largest metropolitan area in Georgia.34 Over the past 
fifteen years, the population of Atlanta—a population served by the 
Chattahoochee—has increased at a rate of around 24 percent.35 As a 
result, Georgia’s withdrawals in the ACF River Basin are significant; 
in 2010, Georgia was responsible for 83 percent of surface water 
withdrawals within the ACF River Basin, which went to serve 93 
percent of the ACF River Basin’s public water-supplied residents.36 
Georgia has projected that it will need to double its withdrawals from 
the river by 2040 to serve its growing population.37 That being said, 
despite the growth in Atlanta’s population, surface water withdrawals 
from the Chattahoochee River Basin have actually decreased since 
2000.38 
Alabama, too, is chiefly concerned with withdrawing water from 
the ACF River Basin in order to support its population (with specific 
concerns as to sewage discharge).39 In 2010, Alabama’s surface water 
withdrawals accounted for roughly 16 percent of those within the ACF 
River Basin, which went to serve approximately 5.7 percent of the 
basin’s population via public water suppliers.40 These flows, Alabama 
contends, are particularly important to spur development in the state’s 
sparsely populated eastern counties along the Georgia border.41 
 
 32. Brief, supra note 25, at app. 4 (Aff. of Judson H. Turner). 
 33. USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 6. 
 34. Lewis B. Jones & John L. Fortuna, Florida’s (Truly) Original Action and Why It’s 
Unlikely to Advance the ACF Interstate Water Rights Dispute, 46 NO. 2 ABA TRENDS 19, 20–21 
(2014). 
 35. ATLANTA REGIONAL COMMISSION, STATE OF THE ATLANTA REGION: 2011 1. 
 36. USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 1. 
 37. Brief, supra note 25, at app. 3–5. 
 38. USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 41–42. 
 39. Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Learning to Get Along: Alabama, Georgia, Florida and the 
Chattahoochee River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993, 996 (1998) (“However, Alabama’s concern 
is not only with the amount of water that reaches the state, but also the quality of that water . . . . 
Currently, Atlanta discharges large amounts of treated waste into the Chattahoochee.”). 
 40. USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 1. 
 41. See Sean Selman, Water Dispute Unites Diverse State Interests, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 4, 1996, at 1A. 
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Despite the interest with water use that it shares with Georgia, 
Alabama has somewhat consistently sided with Florida in the ongoing 
water rights dispute because of its concerns about the quality of the 
water it receives from upstream Atlanta.42 
Florida’s uses of ACF River Basin flows, meanwhile, are almost 
entirely non-extractive and are instead based on Apalachicola River’s 
role in maintaining the Apalachicola Bay’s ecology by supplying 
freshwater.43 The Apalachicola Bay is one of just twenty-eight federal 
National Estuarine Research Reserves in the United States, and, as 
noted above, is home to an abundance of marine life.44 Specifically, the 
Bay serves as a spawning ground for blue crabs and a forage area for a 
number of fish species and migratory birds.45 Notably, the Apalachicola 
Bay’s oyster fishery has “created over many decades a regional 
economy and a unique way of life”46 in the region focused on a “strong 
maritime culture . . . [and] some of the finest oysters in the country.”47 
In 1995, for example, Apalachicola Bay accounted for 12–13 percent 
and 90 percent of the U.S. and Florida oyster harvests, respectively; 
those numbers remained stable through 2011.48 Florida also receives 
several ecosystem service benefits from the Apalachicola River, 
including flood mitigation and attenuation, water filtration, and waste 
assimilation.49 Meanwhile, Florida’s surface water withdrawals from 
the ACF River Basin are fairly low due to a combination of the 
Apalachicola Bay region’s low population and an ample supply of 
water from the Floridian aquifer system.50 In fact, Florida’s surface 
 
 42. Beaverstock, supra note 39, at 996. 
 43.  See Complaint, supra note 7, at 2–3 (noting the important role the ACF River Basin 
plays in maintaining Florida’s riverine and estuarine habitats and the effects flow depletions 
caused by upstream uses have had on these areas). 
 44. Leopold, supra note 31, at 13. 
 45. Apalachicola Bay Aquatic Preserve, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/coastal/sites/apalachicola/aquatic.htm (last visited Nov. 
15, 2016). 
 46. Leopold, supra note 31, at 13. 
 47. APALACHICOLA BAY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.apalachicolabay.org/ (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 48. Compare USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 1 with Brief, supra note 21, at 6 (reporting 
Apalachicola Bay’s share of U.S. oyster production as 13 percent and 12 percent, respectively). 
Alyssa S. Lathrop, Comment, A Tale of Three States: Equitable Apportionment of the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 36 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 865, 869 (2009). 
 49. Complaint, supra note 7, at 13. 
 50. See USGS REPORT, supra note 18, at 15 (finding that “[a]bout 92% of the 2010 ACF 
population resided in Georgia” and noting how the nature of Florida’s aquifer system, composed 
of layers of various sediments with many underground channels and cavities, provides large 
amounts of water). 
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water withdrawals account for just 4 percent of all ACF River Basin 
withdrawals, and none of the surface water withdrawn by Florida is 
used for public water supply.51 
C. Water Wars 
The ACF River Basin has been a water rights battleground since 
the late 1980s.52 Beginning in 1989, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
which operates the main dam north of Atlanta, increased its 
withdrawal of water from the Chattahoochee River by 529 million 
gallons per day—an increase of over 50 percent—in response to a water 
crisis and anticipated population growth in northern Georgia.53 In June 
1990, Alabama filed suit against the Corps, seeking to enjoin the Corps 
from increasing withdrawals from Lake Lanier, near the headwaters of 
the ACF system, and to force compliance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act.54 This litigation was stayed while Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia met at the negotiating table to attempt to resolve 
the ACF issue out of court.55 These negotiations resulted in a 1992 
Memorandum of Agreement, which allowed each state to continue its 
withdrawals with increases allowed only in response to “reasonable 
demand.”56 The Memorandum was incorporated into the 1997 ACF 
Compact.57 This agreement represented a congressionally sanctioned 
attempt by the three states to solve the problem of ACF water 
allocation, but it ended in 2003 without any long-term solution in 
place.58 
In the years following the collapse of the ACF Compact, Alabama, 
Florida, and other parties continued to oppose Georgia’s ongoing plans 
to increase water withdrawals at Lake Lanier, while Georgia itself 
challenged the Corps’ denials of its requests for increased 
withdrawals.59 Since 2003, this water war has been waged on several 
fronts: the Middle District of Florida,60 the Northern District of 
 
 51. Id. at 26. 
 52. See Stephenson, supra note 17, at 86 (noting that “problems first arose in 1986, when 
Georgia weathered an extreme drought”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 55. Id. at 1123. 
 56. Id. 
 57. H.R.J. Res. 91, 105th Congress (1997). 
 58. Lathrop, supra note 48, at 870–71. 
 59. Id. at 872–73. 
 60. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 639 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1355–56 (M.D. Fla. 2009) 
(holding that reallocation of reservoir’s water storage capacity for local consumption without 
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Alabama,61 the 11th Circuit,62 and D.C. Circuit63 all heard cases related 
to the ACF dispute. With the 11th Circuit’s decision in In Re MDL-
1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160, which held that 
the Corps was authorized to allocate Lake Lanier reservoir water for 
Georgia’s water supply under the Rivers and Harbors Act, it appeared 
that the dispute had been resolved in Georgia’s favor (pending a final 
decision by the Corps).64 
However, Florida reopened the issue in an October 1, 2013 
complaint invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over 
interstate water rights disputes and calling for an equitable 
apportionment of the ACF River Basin’s flows.65 The Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case, originally distributing it for conference during 
its Spring 2014 term.66 At the Court’s request, the United States filed 
an amicus curiae brief on September 18, 2014, in which it maintained 
its position that the Supreme Court should refrain from deciding the 
case until the Corps made a decision (expected in 2017) on a revised 
ACF River Basin plan.67 Since November 19, 2014, the case has been 
under consideration by a Court-appointed Special Master, Ralph 
Lancaster, who will review evidence and ultimately recommend a 
decision to the Supreme Court.68 Lancaster is no stranger to water 
disputes—he previously served as a Special Master in a dispute 
between Virginia and Maryland over flows from the Potomac River.69 
His recommendation in that case came after three years of evidence 
collection and review; it is expected that he will be working on a similar 
timetable in Florida v. Georgia.70 
 
congressional approval violated Water Supply Act), rev’d, 644 F.3d 1160, 1200–01 (11th Cir. 
2011). 
 61. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F.Supp 2d 1123, 1124 (N.D. Ala. 2006) 
(dealing with a “taking” of protected mussels based on Army Corps’ building of dams). 
 62. See, e.g., Alabama v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1135–36 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(invalidating injunction against Army Corps); In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 
644 F.3d 1160, 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (authorizing Army Corps to store water in reservoirs in ACF 
River Basin). 
 63. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Green, 514 F.3d 1316, 1322–23 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(considering multi-state agreement and states’ standing). 
 64. In re MDL-1824, 644 F.3d at 1205. 
 65. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1. 
 66. Florida v. Georgia, SCOTUSBLOG: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES BLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/florida-v-georgia-2/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 67. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Florida v. Georgia, No. 22O142 ORG 
(U.S. 2013). 
 68. Droze, Levin & Warihay, supra note 10. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
Munoz - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2017  11:13 AM 
188 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVII:179 
III. THE DOCTRINE: EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT AND ITS 
HISTORY 
As discussed above, equitable apportionment is a unique power of 
the Supreme Court, which hears controversies between states.71 This 
section outlines the origins and evolution of that doctrine, specifically 
by discussing the seminal cases in the area of equitable apportionment. 
These cases are generally divided into two categories: those involving 
western states and those involving eastern states, with the former 
drastically outweighing the latter. This division reflects the differing 
requirements of states in each region vis-à-vis water rights.72 Because 
Florida and Georgia are eastern states with relatively plentiful water 
resources, the most analogous cases to Florida v. Georgia will naturally 
be those between other eastern states. Still, it is important to look to 
western cases for guidance, as these cases make up the bulk of 
equitable apportionment precedent. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Power 
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States 
provides that the judicial power shall extend to “Controversies 
between two or more States”73 and that the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction over cases “in which a State shall be a Party[.]”74 
By definition, interstate water disputes meet both of these criteria, 
putting them on a fast track to hearing before the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Additionally, the Supreme Court has determined 
that interstate waters are covered under its Interstate Commerce 
Clause authority.75 In these cases, the Supreme Court wields a powerful 
common law tool in the form of equitable apportionment.76 In an 
equitable apportionment action, the Supreme Court determines 
whether and how the flows from a shared water source should be 
 
 71. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (describing Supreme Court power over “controversies 
between two or more states”). 
 72. See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND POLICY 758–59, (2d ed. 2009) (contrasting eastern states’ riparian rights systems against 
western states’ systems based on prior appropriation). 
 73. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 74. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 75. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 (1982). 
 76. William D. Olcott, Equitable Apportionment: A Judicial Bridge over Troubled Waters, 66 
NEB. L. REV. 734, 737 (1987) (explaining “[t]he doctrine of equitable apportionment is a form of 
federal common law” and that “in the context of resolving interstate water disputes is attributed 
to Justice Brandeis in Hinderlider v. LaPlata Rivery & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.”). 
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divided among the states involved in the dispute.77 This determination 
is based on many factors (discussed in Parts III.C and III.D, infra), 
including the theory of water rights in each state through which the 
water source in question runs.78 
It should be noted that resorting to an equitable apportionment 
action is not the only means of resolving interstate water disputes. 
States can attempt to negotiate an interstate compact, just as Florida, 
Georgia, and Alabama did in 1997.79 Such compacts are typically 
approved by Congress, making them enforceable under federal law.80 
States also tend to enact state law to enforce the compacts.81 
Alternatively, Congress may act proactively and apportion a 
watercourse via statute.82 However, it has only done so twice: once in 
the case of the Lower Colorado River Basin and a second time with the 
Carson and Truckee Rivers near Lake Tahoe.83 
B. Water Rights: East vs. West 
One significant factor for the Supreme Court to consider in any 
equitable apportionment case is the system for allocating water rights 
in each of the states implicated in the suit.84 The U.S. has two 
predominant systems of water rights allocation: prior appropriation in 
the western states and riparianism in the east.85 Additionally, a number 
of states on both sides of the country employ hybrid permit-based 
systems mixing elements of riparianism and prior appropriation.86 
Prior appropriation, which dominates water rights doctrine in 
western states, is “rooted in aridity and water scarcity” and allocates 
rights to water based on first use.87 Its key characteristics are 
individualistic: the doctrine emphasizes, for example, beneficial use 
and the ability of rights holders to sell or lease their rights to others.88 
 
 77. Id. at 738. 
 78. See id. at 737–38 (explaining that each state has a right to use interstate waters, “but 
usually not to the complete exclusion of another state”). 
 79. Ala. Code. 1975 §33-19-1 Art 2. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Josh Clemons, Esq., Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 115, 128 (2004). 
 83. Beaverstock, supra note 39, at 1004. 
 84. Id. at 997. 
 85. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 72, at 758. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 777. 
 88. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WEST 231–35 (1992). 
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Prior appropriation rights traditionally attached only upon a diversion 
of water flows—in-stream use was insufficient to secure rights.89 Still, 
nearly all prior appropriation states have made recent 
accommodations recognizing the values of in-stream uses, reflecting an 
evolving understanding of the nature of water as a resource.90 The 
traditional focus on extractive use is, in part, a function of the 
geography of the west—in order to create agricultural infrastructure, 
land users have to divert water from the closest water source, which 
can often be several miles away.91 In the traditional prior appropriation 
system, the uses of “senior” rights holders (those who acquired water 
rights earlier) take precedence over those of “junior” rights holders in 
cases where water supply becomes limited.92 
For the purposes of this paper, the eastern doctrine of riparianism 
is more relevant, as the water rights regimes in Alabama, Florida, and 
Georgia all are rooted in riparianism.93 Riparianism is built upon the 
basic assumption that water is relatively available to those seeking to 
use it.94 Under this doctrine, landowners living along a watercourse 
have a right to reasonable use of water flows.95 The reasonableness of 
a use is based on the purpose of the use, the suitability of the use, any 
economic and social values of the use, any harm caused by the use, the 
practicability of avoiding harm by changing use among rights holders, 
the practicality of adjusting quantity of use among rights holders, the 
protection of existing values, and the justice of requiring a user causing 
harm to another’s reasonable use to bear the loss.96 Generally speaking, 
riparianism emphasizes the relationship between downstream and 
upstream uses by multiple rights holders along a watercourse.97 Many 
eastern states, including Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, use 
riparianism as the baseline for their water rights systems.98 However, 
 
 89. Id. at 234. 
 90. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 228, 279 (2015) (characterizing the trend of abandoning the diversion 
requirement and accepting flow maintenance as a beneficial use as “a significant shift in thinking 
about water”). 
 91. See id. at 264 (referencing geographies and agriculture in regards to why certain states 
adopted different apportionment policies based on regional necessity). 
 92. Id. at 229–30. 
 93. See Lathrop, supra note 48, at 896. 
 94. Id. at 881. 
 95. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 72, at 760. 
 96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979). 
 97. See RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 72, at 765–66 (describing intricacies 
of riparian water rights systems). 
 98. See Lathrop, supra note 48, at 881. 
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there is some variation among the states with the addition of permitting 
processes and individual state regulations.99 
C. How the West Was Won 
The vast majority of equitable apportionment cases before the 
Supreme Court have involved disputes between western states.100 Most 
seminal equitable apportionment cases also occurred before the advent 
of the modern era of environmental regulation, meaning that the 
doctrine has not had the opportunity to adapt to contemporary 
environmental concerns or the policy goals underlying federal 
environmental protection statutes and programs.101 Still, since 1907’s 
Kansas v. Colorado, the first major equitable apportionment case, the 
doctrine has become more intricate, developing a multi-factor analysis 
largely in response to water disputes in the west.102  
The Supreme Court first grappled with the issue of equitable 
apportionment in Kansas v. Colorado, where Kansas sued Colorado to 
enjoin it from diverting flows from the Arkansas River.103 The Court 
approached the issue with the “cardinal rule” that each state “stands 
on the same level as all the rest” in all interstate relations, including 
rights in a water body crossing state lines.104 Working from this 
baseline, the Court determined that Kansas, the downstream state, 
could only prevail if it showed that Colorado’s diversions affected 
Kansas’s substantial interests to the point of “destroying the equitable 
apportionment of benefits between the two states resulting from the 
flow of the river.”105 This has become enshrined within equitable 
 
 99. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 72, at 767–68. 
 100. See Andrew Thornley, A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself in a Rare 
Interstate Water Struggle, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 97, 98 (2005) (noting that “[w]hereas the 
West has routinely been the site of interstate water struggles, the Southeast has traditionally had 
enough water to please everyone”). 
 101. See J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a 
New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47, 48–49 (2003) (explaining if this matter were to 
get in front of the Supreme Court, which seems likely, it would be the first major 
interstate apportionment case the Court has entertained in the age of mature environmental 
statutory law. It is not at all clear how thirty years of environmental awareness and regulation 
may have affected the Court’s demeanor when it comes to interstate water allocation). 
 102. See id. at 52 (explaining how the doctrine is “open-ended” and that 
“equitable apportionment encompasses whatever seems relevant to a fair division of the resource 
between the states. This means equitable apportionment is a flexible doctrine, able to incorporate 
new knowledge not only about water demands and uses, but also about the ecology of water in 
general”). 
 103. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
 104. Id. at 97. 
 105. Id. at 117–18. 
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apportionment doctrine as the substantial injury rule, which involves 
the court balancing upstream benefits and downstream harms.106 
The current multi-factor test for equitable apportionment cases 
originated in the 1945 case Nebraska v. Wyoming.107 In this case, 
Nebraska sought to enjoin Colorado and Wyoming’s upstream 
irrigation diversions from the North Platte River.108 The multi-factor 
test for apportionment developed in this case takes into account the 
following considerations: the practical effect of wasteful uses on 
downstream areas, junior appropriators’ economic dependence on the 
contested waters, the priority of appropriation, the availability of 
storage water, the geography and climate in the implicated states, the 
benefits and costs distributed among users, the extent of established 
uses, any consumptive and wasteful uses, and the character and rate of 
return flows.109 While this “test” has been followed in subsequent cases, 
the Court in Nebraska v. Wyoming explicitly noted that the list of 
factors was “merely an illustrative[,] not an exhaustive catalogue.”110 
This case also established a specific test for substantial injury, albeit 
one rooted in the assumptions of the prior appropriation system of 
water rights allocation.111 
In cases decided since Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court has placed 
additional emphasis on the wasteful use factor.112 The Court has 
determined that unreasonable wasteful use by senior rights holders is 
so inequitable as to substantially reduce or even completely forfeit the 
benefits of seniority.113 Some recognized wasteful uses include 
diversion of water underground to no real benefit114 and retention by 
downstream senior rights holders of more water than presently 
needed.115 This line of cases imposes upon all states a duty not to waste 
 
 106. See id. (noting that material depletion of Arkansas river water by Colorado citizens and 
corporations injures substantial interests of Kansas by “destroying the equitable apportionment 
of benefits between the two states”). 
 107. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
 108. Id. at 594. 
 109. See id. at 618 (noting the need “to prove by clear and convincing evidence that actual 
inefficiencies in present uses or future benefits from other uses were highly probable”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 608–09. 
 112. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182–83 (1982) (rejecting the argument that 
priority was the sole focus in equitable apportionment cases). 
 113. Id. at 184. 
 114. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523 (1936) (explaining that this small quantity of 
water “would be quickly absorbed and lost in the deep gravel beneath the channel). 
 115. Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 658 (holding that “[n]o State may play dog in the manger, and 
build up reserves for future use in the absence of present need and present damage”). 
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water and to make reasonable efforts to actively conserve water.116 
Still, the burden of proving wasteful use and alternative conservation 
measures is ultimately on the state asserting them; this burden must be 
met by clear and convincing evidence.117 This relatively high burden 
makes it challenging for plaintiffs to obtain an apportionment in cases 
without clear waste.118 
D. All Quiet on the Eastern Front 
As discussed above, the vast majority of cases building equitable 
apportionment doctrine emerged from conflicts between states in the 
western U.S., where water has historically been scarce. The relative 
dearth of equitable apportionment precedent in eastern state conflicts 
is precisely what gives Florida v. Georgia the potential to have a 
significant impact on the future of equitable apportionment doctrine. 
The only major eastern equitable apportionment case, New Jersey v. 
New York, is factually similar to Florida v. Georgia, so the decision in 
that case offers some guidance here. Still, that case was decided in 1931, 
several years before Nebraska v. Wyoming laid out a detailed factor 
“test” for equitable apportionment cases.119 Thus, the Court’s 
consideration of only a limited number of factors in New Jersey limits 
the case’s usefulness as a guiding source or outcome predictor for a 
modern equitable apportionment case. 
In New Jersey v. New York,120 New Jersey (with Pennsylvania 
intervening) sought to prospectively enjoin Delaware River diversions 
by New York. New Jersey introduced a number of facts that it claimed 
supported a finding of substantial injury resulting from New York’s 
withdrawals, including pollution, injuries to fisheries, damage to 
recreational use, and increased salinity affecting the local oyster 
harvest.121 The Court accepted the last two as supporting a finding of 
substantial injury.122 Hinting at its decision, the Court opened its 
opinion in the case with a somewhat romantic, nature- and equity-
focused framing: “A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It 
offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have 
 
 116. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 328–29 (1984). 
 117. Id. at 323–24. 
 118. See id. at 317 (noting the necessity “to prove by clear and convincing evidence that actual 
inefficiencies in present uses or future benefits from other uses were highly probable”). 
 119. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (outlining detailed factors to consider 
in equitable apportionment disputes). 
 120. 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
 121. Id. at 343–44. 
 122. Id. at 345. 
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power over it.”123 In its brief four-page opinion, the Court went on to 
quickly dispose of the issue, limiting New York’s withdrawals so as to 
protect New Jersey from the damages it feared.124 Focusing on the 
potential of New York’s use to damage the oyster fishery and affect the 
salinity of the river, the Court limited discharges of industrial waste and 
mandated treatment of water entering the river so as to ensure 
reduction of impurities.125 Implicit in this decision is a riparianism-
focused version of equitable apportionment rooted in concerns for all 
users along the watercourse without much weight given to priority of 
appropriation. Arguably, the focus on water quality as it related to the 
recognized effects on New Jersey’s oyster fishery and the river’s 
salinity also suggests that the Court recognized ecosystem-based 
injuries in this case (even though the tie to the oyster fishery linked the 
injury to economic concerns as well). In fact, some scholars view this 
case as the Supreme Court’s earliest—and, so far, only—acceptance of 
environmental claims in the context of equitable apportionment of a 
watercourse.126 With this precedent in mind, it would only take a small 
step for the Court to explicitly recognize environmental injuries in 
Florida v. Georgia. 
IV. THE ARGUMENTS: ECONOMICS & ECOSYSTEMS 
The primary arguments in Florida v. Georgia fall into two 
categories: economics-based and ecosystems-based. Georgia’s 
pleadings emphasize the utility of the ACF River Basin’s flows as a 
water supply for its population.127 Alabama also emphasizes economic 
use, although its use takes the form of irrigation, wastewater treatment, 
and power-generation in the developing eastern portion of the state.128 
Finally, Florida’s affirmative case presents a mix of both traditional 
economics-based arguments for water rights and more novel 
ecosystems-based arguments based on the in-stream value of the ACF 
River Basin’s flows.129 This section considers each state’s arguments 
 
 123. Id. at 342. 
 124. Id. at 346–47. 
 125. Id. at 346. 
 126. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 101, at 54–55 (referencing first noted case to include ecosystem 
services in the calculus of the apportionment analysis). 
 127. State of Georgia’s Opposition to Florida’s Motion for Leave to File a Complaint at 12, 
Florida v. Georgia, No. 22O142 ORG (U.S. 2013) [hereinafter Opposition]. 
 128. See Grant, supra note 16, at 402 (explaining “Alabama fears interference with its own 
growth”; Lathrop, supra note 48, at 874 (describing Alabama and Florida’s uses of ACF flows for 
power generation). 
 129. See Brief, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
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and evaluates them in light of equitable apportionment case law.130 
Special attention is paid to Florida’s environmentally based claims of 
injury, which, if accepted by the Court, would signal a turning point in 
the doctrine of equitable apportionment. 
A. Not A Drop to Drink: Georgia’s Consumptive Use Argument 
In all of its pleadings so far, Georgia has highlighted the 
importance of its consumptive uses of the waters of the ACF Basin.131 
Georgia argues that its use of the Chattahoochee to supply water to 
Atlanta has minimal impacts on the ACF River Basin as whole, 
especially because Georgia is able to return 78 percent of withdrawn 
water to the system.132 Georgia also explains that, because of the 
growth of the Atlanta area, it is already internally motivated to 
conserve water—and has taken measures to do so with a statewide 
water plan and increased involvement by the Metropolitan North 
Georgia Water Planning District in monitoring withdrawals.133 
Georgia contrasts its traditional consumptive uses with Florida’s 
non-consumptive uses, implying that the former takes precedence over 
the latter in equitable apportionment cases.134 In order to state a claim, 
Georgia argues that Florida must show significant harm to Floridians 
“being deprived of water for drinking, domestic, agricultural, or other 
consumptive uses.”135 This argument provides some insight into how 
Georgia views the natural resources provided by the ACF River Basin. 
Georgia’s consumption-focused argument suggests that the state 
adopts a mostly utilitarian view of natural resources, at least as far as 
the ACF River Basin is concerned.136 To be certain, Georgia does have 
an interest in conserving water, suggesting at least some concern with 
intergenerational equity and preserving water for future generations.137 
However, it frames this concern as an anthropocentric one—Georgia 
 
 130. Additional, outcome-specific evaluation of the principal arguments in this case is 
presented in Part 2.A, infra. 
 131. See generally Opposition, supra note 127; Supplemental Brief for the State of Georgia, 
Florida v. Georgia, No. 22O142 ORG (U.S. 2013) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief]. 
 132. Opposition, supra note 127, at 12. 
 133. Jones & Fortuna, supra note 34, at 3. 
 134. See Opposition, supra note 127, at 28. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 72, at 16 (defining the traditionally 
anthropocentric doctrine of utilitarianism as seeking “to provide the greatest good to the greatest 
number of people”). 
 137. See id. at 20 (describing the notion of passing on the planet and its resources to future 
generations so as to provide equitable access to its resources and assets). 
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needs to conserve water because it wants to maximize its availability to 
future Georgians to promote the state’s growth.138 Without Florida 
showing that its uses fall into a similar category, Georgia argues, the 
Sunshine State cannot make out a claim.139 
Moreover, Georgia highlights the distance involved in this case, 
saying that water withdrawals over four hundred miles upstream from 
the Apalachicola Bay make only a minute difference in the flows 
received by Florida.140 Implicit in this argument is a soft rejection of the 
concept of ecological interdependence.141 By noting the large distance 
between the Chattahoochee’s headwaters and the Apalachicola Bay, 
Georgia attempts to minimize the effects of upstream use, suggesting 
that, at least from a causal perspective, harms in the Florida panhandle 
cannot be blamed on water withdrawals in northern Georgia.142 
Interestingly, Georgia appears to lean somewhat on the concept of 
progressive management,143 noting that it is the Army Corps of 
Engineers, not Georgia, who is responsible for assuring flows to 
Florida.144 Before the Court granted Florida leave to file its Complaint, 
Georgia consistently argued that the suit was meaningless if the Corps 
was not involved or had not yet issued its new Master Manual for the 
ACF River Basin.145 Georgia argues that it is doing its part to 
responsibly use and conserve water, but that the Corps needs to update 
its plans to address any concerns Florida may have about the ACF 
River Basin.146 Without expert intervention by the Army Corps, 
Georgia argues, any discussion of this matter is incomplete.147 
Considering these perspectives in the context of equitable 
apportionment doctrine also reveals some weak points in Georgia’s 
 
 138. See Opposition, supra note 127, at 37a–38a (chart showing historical and forecasted 
population of counties using Lake Lanier system for water supply). 
 139. See id. at 31 (arguing that Florida failed to plead plausible facts and that “[t]he court 
should therefore deny Florida leave to file its complaint”). 
 140. Opposition, supra note 127, at 3–4. 
 141. See Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 174 (2012) (explaining how the concept of ecological inter-
dependence persists). 
 142. Jones & Fortuna, supra note 34, at 21. 
 143. See Purdy, supra note 141, at 173 (explaining that progressive management requires 
expert governance to serve human ends). 
 144. Opposition, supra note 127, at 4, 20–21 (explaining that Georgia’s requests for additional 
withdrawals and Florida’s concerns about the flow of water from Lake Sidney Lanier should be 
addressed by an upcoming update of the Corps’ Master Manual, which governs the operation of 
Buford Dam and release of water downstream). 
 145. Id. at 3. 
 146. Id. at 20–21. 
 147. Id. at 17.  
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case. Firstly, while the factor analysis set forth in Nebraska v. Wyoming 
does take into account consumptive use as a factor, nowhere does it say 
that that consumptive use should be given any more weight than other 
types of uses. Additionally, Georgia does not make a clear argument 
that benefits from the ACF flows are already equitably apportioned 
among the states in which the river basin lies, which would be an 
effective counter to Florida’s demand for an apportionment.148 Instead, 
Georgia highlights that the majority of the ACF River Basin is located 
in Georgia; again, while the geographic distribution of the watercourse 
is a consideration in the Nebraska v. Wyoming factor analysis, it is not 
dispositive.149 Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Georgia all but 
ignores the facts of New Jersey v. New York by characterizing the facts 
of the current case as completely novel and rejecting the notion that 
the Supreme Court could view proven environmental damages as 
favoring an equitable apportionment.150 
B. Good Allocation Makes Good Neighbors: Alabama’s Interest  
Although not named as a party in this case, Alabama also has 
important interests in the ACF River Basin and thus has filed a brief 
as amicus curiae.151 As noted above, Alabama was previously involved 
in a number of suits and negotiations with Georgia and the Army 
Corps of Engineers dealing with the same uses at issue in this case.152 
In fact, Alabama has consistently made use of the ACF River Basin’s 
flows since an 1889 agreement with Georgia ceding some control of the 
Chattahoochee to Alabama (despite the fact that the river technically 
is on the Georgia side of the state line).153 
The Chattahoochee River serves as an important waterway for 
eastern Alabama.154 Most pertinently, Alabama has consistently 
argued that diminished flows in the Chattahoochee might slow 
 
 148. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 118 (1907) (describing equitable apportionment as 
principally concerned with equitable distribution of benefits from a shared watercourse). 
 149. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 606 (1945) (accepting the Special Master’s 
finding on the location of the river mostly in Nebraska as an “exceptional” feature of the river). 
 150. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 345 (1931) (characterizing increased salinity 
in the Delaware River as a result of upstate uses as “serious”). 
 151. Brief for Alabama as Amicus Curiae Regarding Non-Joinder of Alabama at 2, Florida 
v. Georgia, No. 22O142 ORG (U.S. 2013). 
 152. See, e.g., Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F. Supp.2d 1123 (N.D. Ala. 2006). 
 153. Carl Erhardt, The Battle Over “The Hooch”: The Federal-Interstate Water Compact and 
the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200, 210 (1992). 
 154. See Grant, supra note 16, at 402 (describing the Chattahoochee River’s role in increased 
water use in Atlanta and its effect on Alabama). 
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industrial and commercial growth in the eastern portion of the state.155 
Specifically, Alabama claims that the already-tainted water it receives 
from upstream impedes its ability to discharge its own wastewater into 
the river while remaining in compliance with environmental 
standards.156 Like Florida, Alabama does not actually consume much 
water from the ACF. Thus, its interests are similar to those of Florida 
in that it seeks to emphasize the value of in-stream use and water 
quality and highlight the detrimental effects of upstream use in 
Atlanta.157 
C. Much Ado About Mollusks: Florida’s Environmental Concerns 
In this case, Florida makes an argument that is somewhat novel in 
the context of equitable apportionment actions.158 Essentially, Florida 
argues that an equitable apportionment of the ACF River Basin is 
appropriate because of the environmental value that the river’s natural 
flows deliver to the Apalachicola Region.159 Florida makes this 
argument in three ways: by criticizing Georgia’s use,160 by detailing the 
ecological and cultural significance of the Apalachicola Bay,161 and—
perhaps most significantly—by urging the Court to make room for 
science’s evolving understandings of the environment in its equitable 
apportionment doctrine.162 
Florida’s complaint sets the ACF River Basin up as a realm of 
competing uses. On the one hand, there is Georgia, whose “unrelenting 
thirst” hinders flows to both Alabama and Florida.163 Then there is 
Florida, which is portrayed as a responsible steward who has 
historically utilized the river’s natural flows to sustain ecological and 
economic communities.164 Like Georgia, Florida points out that 
 
 155. Id. See also Lathrop, supra note 48, at 874 (explaining how “low flows” can harm 
industrial and power uses in Alabama). 
 156. Beaverstock, supra note 39, at 996. 
 157. See Lathrop, supra note 48, at 895 (explaining how Alabama and Florida do not consume 
“large amounts of water from the ACF River Basin”). 
 158. See Leopold, supra note 31, at 16 (describing Florida’s argument for equitable 
apportionment of ACF River Basin waters). 
 159. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 2–3 (claiming that the ecosystem is suffering from 
Georgia’s storage of water from the Chattahoochee River). 
 160. Id. at 15. 
 161. Id. at 10. 
 162. See State of Florida’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Leave to File a Complaint, 
Florida v. Georgia at 11, No. 22O142 ORG (U.S. 2013) [hereinafter Reply] (noting that estimates 
of return flows and downstream impacts are debated). 
 163. Complaint, supra note 7, at 21. 
 164. See generally id. 
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Atlanta uses water from the ACF River Basin for the population of 
Atlanta—and that its demands are anticipated to double within the 
next twenty-three years.165 Unlike Atlanta, however, Florida describes 
at length Georgia’s use of ACF flows for agricultural irrigation, which 
Florida says accounts for most of the water use in the Flint River 
Basin.166 While it stops short of labeling this use as wasteful (a term that 
carries weight in equitable apportionment decisions), Florida 
emphasizes that the Flint River Basin is sufficiently irrigated by rainfall 
to keep crops growing, meaning that withdrawing additional waters 
from the ACF River Basin provides Georgia only marginal, minimal 
value.167 By steering mostly clear of the Atlanta water use, Georgia’s 
strongest justification for its withdrawals, and attacking Georgia’s 
other withdrawals as redundant or needless, Florida makes its 
strongest case against Georgia’s current water use practices—practices 
that Florida claims reduce the flows that ultimately reach the 
Apalachicola Bay. 
Florida’s more interesting argument, however, focuses on the 
value of the ACF River Basin’s flows within Florida itself. This 
argument, which revolves around the ecological, cultural, and 
historical importance of the Apalachicola Bay and the Apalachicola’s 
natural flows, is couched in language reflecting an interesting 
understanding of nature as a mix of romantic epiphany and ecological 
interdependence.168 The romantic epiphany view is most evident in the 
language Florida adopts in its complaint and brief, both of which paint 
the Apalachicola Bay as a pristine wilderness supporting myriad 
species of plant and animal life.169 Throughout these documents, 
Florida also makes efforts to connect water uses four hundred miles 
upstream in Atlanta with diminished flows in the Florida panhandle, 
reflecting an acceptance of the interconnectedness of natural resources 
like water.170 Florida opens its Brief in Support for Leave to File a 
 
 165. Id. at 16. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Brief, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 168. See Purdy, supra note 141, at 173–74 (discussing American understandings of the natural 
world including romantic epiphany, in which humans find freedom from “places or qualities in 
the natural world,” and ecological interdependence, in which the human experience is linked to 
the natural world). 
 169. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 2 (describing the Apalachicola River as “nourish[ing] a 
rare and exemplary ecosystem” and as “a unique and vibrant cultural, economic and social 
community”; id. at 10 (discussing the “rich biodiversity of the Apalachicola Region”); id. at 13 
(citing ecosystem services supporting “one of the most storied working waterfronts in the State”); 
Brief, supra note 25, at 1 (describing the Apalachicola River and Bay as “a treasure”). 
 170. Complaint, supra note 7, at 17–20; see Purdy, supra note 141, at 207. 
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Complaint by quoting Holmes’ opinion in New Jersey v. New York, 
characterizing the Apalachicola River as “a treasure–a unique and 
vibrant cultural, social, and economic community.171 The brief details 
the history of the Apalachicola Bay’s oyster industry and the ecological 
importance of freshwater flows in assuring the continued existence of 
a sustainable and economically productive oyster fishery.172 Still, 
Florida emphasizes that there is more than economic prosperity at 
stake here by pointing out the number of species and the “rare and 
exemplary ecosystem” that calls the Apalachicola Bay home.173 Losing 
this biodiversity, Florida argues, amounts to a substantial injury 
justifying equitable apportionment.174 
Florida’s novel environmental argument in this case stands on 
somewhat shaky ground, mostly due to the injury requirement. As 
discussed above, the Supreme Court has not decided an equitable 
apportionment case since 1982.175 Consequently, it has had few 
opportunities to consider arguments incorporating modern 
environmental science and how they might fit within the doctrine of 
equitable apportionment, specifically with regard to what constitutes 
an injury for the purposes of equitable apportionment.176 In order to 
prevail in an equitable apportionment case, a state must, among other 
things, demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that its interests 
have been substantially injured by the defendant’s use of the shared 
watercourse.177 As noted above, states in both the east and the west 
have come to recognize the value of in-stream use justifications for 
rights, which generally tend to be somewhat more environmentally 
focused than traditional, use-based water rights justifications.178 Courts 
in these states have accepted broader conceptions of the beneficial in-
stream value of a river’s flows and how damage to in-stream flows can 
constitute injury.179 And while the Supreme Court has yet to speak on 
 
 171. Brief, supra note 25, at 1. 
 172. Id. at 9–10. 
 173. Complaint, supra note 7, at 2. 
 174. Id. at 10–12. 
 175. See Lauren D. Bernadett, Equitable Apportionment in the Supreme Court: An Overview 
of the Doctrine and the Factors Considered by the Supreme Court in Light of Florida v. Georgia, 
29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 511, 513 n.10 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court has only decided 
eight equitable apportionment cases, with Colorado v. New Mexico being the most recent). 
 176. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945) (detailing the injury requirement). 
 177. Ruhl, supra note 101, at 51. 
 178. See MacDonnell, supra note 90, at 279; Ruhl, supra note 102, at 55 (discussing trends in 
western states away from diversion requirement). 
 179. See MacDonnell, supra note 90, at 279 n.338 (citing cases in Idaho and Wyoming where 
the court considered in-stream uses to be beneficial). 
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the issues of water quality and in-stream use, it is certainly plausible 
that it too has come to better understand ecosystem services provided 
by in-stream water use and could base its conception of injury upon 
such an understanding.180 In fact, some scholars have identified the 
ACF dispute as a sort of litmus test for the Court’s modern 
understanding of water use and quality, potentially marking “the dawn 
of a new era for the doctrine of equitable apportionment.”181 
The final section of this paper explores various potential 
outcomes—all of which turn on the Court’s acceptance or rejection of 
the claim of ecosystem injuries.182 Before exploring that issue further, 
however, it is important to note that Florida’s strongest argument may 
well be the one it touches on least in its complaint: the traditional 
economic argument.183 In its complaint, Florida lays out damages to the 
Apalachicola’s commercial oyster fishery that it alleges can be traced 
to Georgia’s withdrawal of water from the ACF River Basin.184 This is 
the very same sort of injury that the Court viewed as justifying an 
equitable apportionment of the Delaware River in 1931.185 Considering 
this similar fact pattern (increased salinity resulting in decreased oyster 
viability), as long as Florida’s evidence as to causation is sufficient, it is 
probable that the Court will view the damage to the Apalachicola Bay 
oyster fishery as rising to the level of injury independent of any damage 
to the ecosystem of the bay.186 The more interesting question, however, 
is whether and to what extent Florida’s environmental argument sets 
precedent for future equitable apportionment cases. 
V. THE POTENTIAL OUTCOMES: MODERNIZING EQUITABLE 
APPORTIONMENT 
Florida v. Georgia presents an important question for the 
Supreme Court: can environmental harms constitute “substantial 
 
 180. See Ruhl, supra note 101, at 55. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Part V.A., infra. 
 183. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 12–13 (alleging injury to Florida’s economy based on 
reduced flows from the ACF River Basin that “cannot be replaced”). 
 184. Id. at 9, 12. 
 185. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 345 (1931) (pointing to the effect of increased 
salinity on the oyster fishery as “somewhat more serious” than the effect upon municipal or other 
uses). 
 186. See id. However, even in New Jersey, the Court’s decision ultimately was steeped in 
language reflecting economic, not environmental concerns. New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 343–44 
(counting among the harms injury to the oyster fishery, shad fisheries, agriculture, and 
recreational use of the river). 
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injury” for the purposes of an equitable apportionment? Until now, the 
Court has recognized only traditional economic harms as meeting the 
substantial injury requirement.187 Thus, Florida’s claims of injury to the 
Apalachicola Bay’s animal and plant population are mostly (although, 
as discussed supra, not entirely) novel in the equitable apportionment 
context. The Court’s (and, by extension, the Special Master’s) 
acceptance or rejection of Florida’s claims of ecosystem-centric injury 
here will pave the way for the future of equitable apportionment cases. 
This section explores the three general families of possible outcomes 
in this case. First, there is the possibility that the Court will simply 
decide the case in accordance with existing equitable apportionment 
precedent, which focuses on more economic injuries. While unlikely, 
the Court might also reverse course somewhat and base its decision 
purely on economic use. Finally, the Court could affect a significant 
shift in equitable apportionment doctrine by accepting environmental 
claims of injury. 
A. The Status Quo Outcome 
The outcome of Florida v. Georgia is somewhat difficult to predict 
under existing equitable apportionment precedent—this is the very 
reason why the case has inspired so much scholarship and debate. Still, 
it is quite possible that the Supreme Court will decide the case in light 
of its current doctrine. Under this approach, it is likely that Florida will 
eke out Georgia by a narrow margin and succeed in its efforts to obtain 
an apportionment. 
The key factor here is the precedent set in New Jersey v. New 
York.188 Not only is this one of the few eastern equitable 
apportionment cases, but its facts are also strikingly similar to those in 
Florida v. Georgia. In New Jersey, downstream New Jersey, like 
downstream Florida, presented a mix of economic and environmental 
claims for injury.189 Ultimately, the Court accepted the more traditional 
economic claims as injury, although its opinion gave important nods to 
the environmental aspects of New Jersey’s harm.190 
Here, Florida could win under the traditional route based not on 
the ecological damage to its oyster fishery, but on the economic impact 
 
 187. Ruhl, supra note 101, at 52–53 (arguing, however, that based on modern understandings 
of ecosystems, “ecological injury in fact is economic injury”). 
 188. 283 U.S. 336. 
 189. Id. at 343–44 (noting New Jersey’s alleged injuries to navigability, water power, the 
oyster fishery, water supplies, agriculture, and recreation). 
 190. Id. at 345. 
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of this damage upon the Apalachicola region’s economy—much like 
New Jersey did. Florida has pled facts regarding this type of injury, 
specifically discussing the decrease in oyster production191 and the 
importance of the river to the area’s tourism economy.192 If it is 
successful in identifying Georgia’s withdrawals as the cause of such 
injuries, Florida may succeed in obtaining an equitable apportionment 
of the ACF River Basin’s flows. 
A decision on this basis is unlikely to herald any groundbreaking 
changes in the doctrine of equitable apportionment, as this sort of 
outcome falls squarely within the realm of existing precedent dating 
back over one hundred years. At most, it will shift equitable apportion 
doctrine only slightly by clarifying the doctrine’s status in riparian 
rights states. Specifically, a decision on this basis would have to lay out 
how to apply the Nebraska factors in eastern, riparian states in order 
to reflect a system in which priority of appropriation is not 
determinative of rights. Still, if the Supreme Court does not accept the 
environmental argument here, it could signal that the Court will not 
accept environmentally based injuries for the foreseeable future. If the 
Court passes on such a claim in this case—its first equitable 
apportionment decision in over thirty years—it may mean that, at least 
in the eyes of the current Court, environmental injuries do not rise to 
a level justifying an extraordinary exercise of the judicial power in the 
form of apportionment. 
B. The Utilitarian Outcome 
A decision based on pure economic efficiency is unlikely in this 
case. Still, considering the possibility of this sort of decision offers 
insight into the methods the Court uses in valuing natural resources 
like surface water. In examining this potential outcome, this section 
considers how the Special Master and the Court might weigh the 
comparative values of use in the rural Florida panhandle against those 
in growing metropolitan Atlanta. 
From a purely utilitarian perspective, Georgia should win this case 
and Florida’s request for an apportionment should probably be denied. 
Georgia’s filings with the Court cite the growth of the Atlanta metro 
area and the corresponding increase in pressure on northern Georgia’s 
water supplies.193 Without the ability to withdraw from the ACF River 
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Basin at levels sufficient to meet demand, one of the nation’s fastest-
growing cities would likely see its expansion screech to a halt.194 
Additionally, Georgia has some strong arguments that it is 
withdrawing water responsibly, which is a factor under the Nebraska v. 
Wyoming analysis and helps to counter Florida’s arguments regarding 
waste.195 Moreover, a number of the other Nebraska v. Wyoming 
factors—cost and benefits of use distributed users, availability of 
storage water, and the nature of consumptive use—all indicate that 
economic considerations, which tend to favor Georgia, do play a 
significant role in equitable apportionment decisions.196 
A decision on these grounds, however, would mark a bizarre 
backward step in the doctrine of equitable apportionment. In cases like 
Kansas v. Colorado and New Jersey v. New York, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that all states stand on equal footing when it comes to 
water rights, suggesting that differences in population among states 
should not carry significant weight in equitable apportionment 
decisions.197 Moreover, the decision in New Jersey, where the Court 
granted the apportionment for the smaller state with fewer 
traditionally economic uses, marked a step away from the kind of pure 
economic considerations emphasized by Georgia.198 A decision in favor 
of Georgia solely based on economic utility (as opposed to, say, a lack 
of causation) would make little sense in light of precedent that requires 
a balancing of both economic and non-economic factors.199 
C. The Environmentalist Outcome 
Finally, the Court could, by embracing Florida’s claims of 
environmental injury, significantly alter the landscape of equitable 
apportionment doctrine. As discussed above, the Court has not 
decided an equitable apportionment case during the era of modern 
environmental science and regulation. Florida v. Georgia therefore has 
 
 194. See id. at 26–27. 
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the potential to reinvigorate the doctrine in light of modern 
understandings of ecological interdependence200 and changed 
environmental values. 
If the Court finds a causal connection between Georgia’s 
withdrawals from the ACF River Basin and accepts Florida’s claims of 
environmental injury as meeting the substantial injury requirement, 
Florida almost certainly wins apportionment in this case. And it is 
certainly possible—in New Jersey v. New York, the Court 
acknowledged increased salinity in the Delaware River as justifying an 
apportionment.201 While the New Jersey decision was ultimately based 
on economic damages, the Court’s willingness to consider and mention 
salinity in its decision reflects a fundamental understanding of the 
interrelatedness of environmental conditions and the economic use of 
water. A formal recognition of this understanding in the context of 
Florida’s claims of substantial injury to the state’s interest in the 
Apalachicola Bay would be a step further in this direction and an 
explicit acceptance of the ecological interdependence of natural 
resource systems.202 An outcome on this basis also would be consistent 
with riparian rights systems in eastern states, as it would reflect a 
concern with all users along a shared watercourse, regardless of priority 
of appropriation. Thus, Florida v. Georgia, which presents opposing 
economic and environmental arguments, is the perfect opportunity for 
the Supreme Court to adopt “a new water law for a new water age.”203 
For Florida, victory in this case would mean an assurance of 
approximate natural flows, Supreme Court-sanctioned protection of 
biodiversity and natural resources in the panhandle, and a potential 
source of usable water should Florida’s water problems204 worsen with 
sea level rise. More important, however, is the impact of an 
“environmentalist” decision on equitable apportionment doctrine as a 
whole. If the Court issues an “environmentalist” decision, it will better 
allow downstream states to preserve their waters, even when their uses 
of those waters are largely non-economic. This sort of protection will 
be doubly strong in the east, where riparian rights tend to solidify 
access to shared watercourses. By accepting damage to ecosystem 
 
 200. See Purdy, supra note 141, at 173–74 (describing the concept of ecological 
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services as substantial injury, the Court would bring its doctrine into 
the modern era and assure better consistency with modern scientific 
understandings of the value of natural resources.205 
To be sure, this sort of outcome runs the risk of opening the 
Supreme Court to a flood (no pun intended) of water rights cases based 
on ecological injury, so drawing a clear line is crucial. The Court 
already has the basis for a clear line in its Nebraska v. Wyoming factor 
test.206 If it chooses to acknowledge ecological injury, it need only 
modify these factors to more clearly explain the balance between 
economic and non-economic values of water use. Currently, the test is 
somewhat unclear on this front, so it is important that any decision in 
this case provide a means of valuing water resources in a way that 
accurately takes into account the added benefit of ecosystem services. 
There is significant room in this area for input from professionals in the 
environmental policy and science fields; in fact, if equitable 
apportionment doctrine is ever to become fully consistent with modern 
understandings of natural resources, expert involvement is crucial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The long-running dispute over the ACF River Basin appears to be 
coming to an end with the Supreme Court’s impending decision in 
Florida v. Georgia. While the case will hopefully bring closure to the 
three states involved, it also offers the Court the chance to revise and 
reinvigorate its equitable apportionment doctrine for the first time in 
several decades. The clear dichotomy between the arguments 
presented by each side—traditional economic use by Georgia versus 
environmentally focused in-stream use by Florida—presents an ideal 
opportunity for the Court to opine on the different ways to value 
natural resources, specifically when it comes to use value versus the 
values of existence and ecosystem services. If the Court embraces the 
ecological injury proposed by Florida, it will usher in a new era of 
equitable apportionment doctrine that is consistent with contemporary 
understandings of ecological interdependence, resource use, and 
mankind’s relationship with the world of natural resources. 
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